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THIRD-PARTY FINANCING OF CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
WILL THE SKY FALL?
Deborah R. Hensler*
“One day Henny-penny was picking up corn in the cornyard when—
whack!—something hit her upon the head.  ‘Goodness gracious me!’
said Henny-penny; ‘the sky’s a-going to fall; I must go and tell the
king.’”1
INTRODUCTION
The advent of third-party litigation financing—the funding of law-
suits by entities other than parties or their legal representatives—in
the United States has stimulated legal scholarship, policy debate, and
interest group advocacy.  Some scholarship fails to distinguish among
financers that use different business models and target different mar-
ket segments, which can make it difficult to assess normative recom-
mendations.2  Nonetheless, most scholars are cautious in drawing
conclusions about the cost–benefit ratio of introducing third-party fi-
nancing into the legal system.  Likewise, the policy debate has been
cautious, as leaders of the bar have adopted a “wait and see” attitude
in response to calls for regulation.3  The advocacy has been strident,
however, with corporate interest groups pressing hard for regulation
—if not absolute prohibition—of third-party financing not only in the
* Judge John W. Ford Professor of Dispute Resolution, Stanford Law School.  I am grateful
to Manuel Go´mez for sharing his knowledge of the Chevron–Ecuador litigation, to Radoslaw
Goral for sharing his research findings on the structure of the litigation financing market in the
United States, and to Jasminka Kalajdzic for comments on an earlier draft.
1. JOSEPH JACOBS, Henny-Penny, in ENGLISH FAIRY TALES (London, David Nutt 1890),
available at http://www.surlalunefairytales.com/authors/jacobs/english/hennypenny.html.  In the
United States, Henny-penny is frequently referred to as Chicken Little.
2. See, e.g., Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of
Litigation Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 673 (2012).
3. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
2 (2012) [hereinafter ABA WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informa
tional_report.authcheckdam.pdf; Bethany Rabe, NYC Bar Weighs in on Litigation Financing,
A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS (Aug., 29, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_
stories/082911-new-york-city-bar-third-party-litigation-financing.html.
499
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United States but in other jurisdictions as well.4  No group has been as
strident or as active in opposition to third-party litigation financing as
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform, and no
area of legal practice has been more clearly targeted for prohibition of
such financing than class action litigation.5
In its advocacy materials, the Chamber focuses attention on Austra-
lia,6 where third-party litigation financing has shaped class action liti-
gation over the past two decades.  In the Chamber’s telling, the
Australian experience should warn the other animals in the barnyard
that the sky is falling.  Like Henny-penny, the Chamber mistakes an
acorn for the sky.  As in the fable, those who follow the Chamber’s
advice may find themselves in the clutches of Foxy-woxy, who ulti-
mately lures Henny-penny and her animal followers to his den, only to
eat them all.
This Article discusses the possible consequences of third-party liti-
gation financing for class action litigation in the United States.  Part II
describes the market for third-party litigation financing in the United
States and discusses the potential for litigation investment in U.S.
class action litigation.7  Part III unpacks the criticisms of third-party
litigation financing with particular reference to U.S. class actions and
considers their empirical basis.  Part IV describes the Australian fed-
eral class action procedure and the role of third-party litigation financ-
4. Letter from Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Inst. for Legal Re-
form, to Rt. Hon. Kenneth Clark QC MP, Lord Chancellor and Secr’y of State for Justice, UK
Ministry of Justice (July 13, 2011), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/de-
fault/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/international/2011_07_13_us_chamber_letter_to_uk_
moj.pdf (opposing collective litigation and third-party financing); Comments of the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform on the Civil Procedure Amendment (Supreme Court
Representative Proceedings) Bill 2010, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REF. (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/images2/stories/documents/pdf/interna-
tional/ilrresponsetothecivilprocedureamendment.pdf.  Other business groups have joined in op-
position to third-party litigation financing. See, e.g., State & Policy Affairs Dep’t, Third-Party
Litigation Funding: Tipping the Scales of Justice for Profit, NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPA-
NIES (May 2011), http://www.namic.org/pdf/publicpolicy/1106_thirdPartyLitigation.pdf.
5. See, e.g., JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAW-
SUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (2009);
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THIRD PARTY FINANCING: ETHICAL & LEGAL
RAMIFICATIONS IN COLLECTIVE ACTIONS (2009) [hereinafter ETHICAL & LEGAL
RAMIFICATIONS].
6. BEISNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 9–11; ETHICAL & LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS, supra note 5, at
17–22.
7. Some U.S. lawyers and legal scholars still mistakenly assume that class action litigation is
unique to the United States.  For a discussion of the global spread of class actions, see Deborah
R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Financing, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306 (2011).  The proliferation of class actions and other group litigation
procedures offers an opportunity to investigate the consequences of different fee regimes for the
implementation of collective litigation rules.
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ing in the class action domain, presents statistical data on the
frequency and types of class actions in Australia, and reflects on the
lessons of the Australian experience for the United States.  Part V
concludes with a consideration of the likelihood that the sky would
fall if third-party litigation financing were to become common in class
action litigation in the United States.
II. BACKGROUND
Roughly speaking, there are two claim markets that third-party liti-
gation financers in the United States have targeted: (1) ordinary tort
claims, typically for modest amounts, brought by individuals of limited
means; and (2) commercial claims for damages, typically for quite
large amounts, brought or defended by corporations.  Virtually every-
thing about these markets is different, save for the fact that in each
market the financers’ interest in the lawsuits is solely monetary.
A. The Potential for Third-Party Litigation Financing of
Class Actions in the United States
Some have likened the tort claims market to the payday loan mar-
ket8: the financers provide funds to relatively unsophisticated people
who have colorable personal injury claims, but whose personal cir-
cumstances are so straitened that they find it attractive to promise a
large portion of the recovery they may ultimately receive in court in
exchange for immediate help in covering current expenses.  The
funder provides money directly to the claimant, usually in the form of
a nonrecourse loan,9 in order to skirt usury law restrictions on the
share of the recovery the funder can obtain.  The loans are usually for
a few thousand dollars, and sometimes tens of thousands of dollars,
but rarely larger.  The typical claims arise out of automobile accidents
and slip-and-falls for which there is a high likelihood of recovery,10
8. Page C. Faulk, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, Presentation on Third-Party Litiga-
tion Financing (executive summary available at http://www.wial.com/wwcms/wp-content/
uploads/2012/09/Litigation-Loans.pdf).  Others have analogized this part of the litigation financ-
ing industry to the subprime mortgage market. See Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing:
Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83
(2008).
9. A nonrecourse loan is a loan in which the lender will not be reimbursed if the claim fails.
10. Available data indicate that insurance reimburses upwards of three-quarters of economic
losses associated with automobile accident injuries and that roughly half of victims retain lawyers
to represent them during claims processing.  Most claims are settled, and plaintiffs win about half
of the small percentage of cases that go to trial.  In sum, automobile accident injury disputes are
not high risk cases. JAMES ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH AU-
TOMOBILE NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A RETROSPECTIVE 87–97 (2010), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG860.pdf; see also
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and thus some return on the loan is almost certain.  The funder has no
formal relationship with the claimant’s lawyer, thereby forestalling
charges that lawyers and nonlawyers are splitting fees.  The law firms
representing claimants who obtain loans are typically small, although
a single firm may handle a large volume of small-to-moderate-value
claims.11  The funders minimally screen claims to determine whether
to offer funding;12 like many of the lawyers in this claim market, their
approach is routinized and their business model relies on handling a
high volume of similar cases without much, if any, individualized
treatment.13  Many of the funders in this market advertise their loans
online and some offer loans against other similar assets, such as struc-
tured settlements, annuities, and the lifetime value of a winning lot-
tery ticket.14  Lenders are attracted to the market by its potential to
earn high rates of return per claim on a large volume of loans.  The
high rate of return is likely the result of the circumstances of the bor-
rower-victims, rather than the riskiness of the loan.  Because of its
characteristics, some have described this market as the litigation lend-
ing market.
The second market is akin to an equity market: in exchange for a
share of the damages recovered, the financers fund either a business
with a colorable legal claim or the lawyers representing the business
(or both) to pursue litigation that would otherwise be too risky or too
expensive to pursue with the intensity that would maximize net bene-
fit.15  The claimants in this market are sophisticated business decision
LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS
IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 4 tbl. 5, 10 (2008), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.
pdf.
11. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485,
1491–92 (2009) (describing these types of firms as “settlement mills”).
12. For example, Woodbridge Pre-Settlement Funding, LLC advertises, “Any legal claim with
good merits may qualify for a [sic] litigation funding from Woodbridge.  We offer pre settlement
funding for pending lawsuit cases that contain: Proven Negligence or Compelling Liability; De-
fendants with an established ability to pay the potential settlement; [and] Damage Documenta-
tion.” What Pending Lawsuits Will Qualify for Litigation Funding? WOODBRIDGE PRE-
SETTLEMENT FUNDING, http://www.woodbridgepresettlement2.pth4.com/attorneys-pending-law-
suit-litigation-funding/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
13. See Deborah R. Hensler, Financing Civil Litigation: The US Perspective, in NEW TRENDS
IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A LEGAL, EMPIRICAL, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
149, 162–63 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010).
14. Woodbridge describes itself as a “pioneer in the cash now financial services industry.”
About Woodbridge Pre-Settlement Funding, WOODBRIDGE PRE-SETTLEMENT FUNDING, http://
www.woodbridgepresettlement2.pth4.com/about-woodbridge-pre-settlement-funding/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2013).
15. Commentators note that commercial litigation financers may enter into funding and risk-
sharing agreements with corporate defendants, see, e.g., Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This
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makers who are represented by corporate law firms.16  The funders
are institutional investors—including banks, insurance companies, and
hedge funds—whose investments are managed by specialized litiga-
tion financing firms.  These entities focus on high-value claims, which
they investigate carefully in order to estimate accurately the expected
payoff.17  The financers rarely consider funding claims worth less than
several millions of dollars, and some operate at a much higher dollar
threshold.18  These claims are typically much more expensive to liti-
gate than an automobile accident claim and also more risky.  In con-
trast to the litigation lending market, this might be described as the
“litigation investment” market, although the financial instruments, as
in the first market, are loans.19
Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1276–77 (2011), but there are
few details publicly available about the nature of these agreements.
16. See Nate Raymond, More Attorneys Exploring Third-Party Litigation Funding, N.Y. L.J.
(June 4, 2010), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=120245919506
0&slreturn=20130306182914 (highlighting the practices of corporate litigator Louis Solomon, at-
torney at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP).
17. Burfurd Capital Ltd.—which claims it is the “world’s largest provider of investment capi-
tal and risk solutions for litigation,” BURFORD CAPITAL LTD., LAW FIRM FINANCING SOLUTIONS
FROM BURFORD 1 (2013), available at http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/
10/2013-10-01-Burford-Finance-One-Sheet.pdf—asserts: “[C]ommercial litigation financing in-
volves sophisticated corporate parties, represented by major law firms, with the financier invest-
ing millions of dollars—sometimes more than $15 million.  These are bespoke and highly-
negotiated arrangements.” The Basics, BURFORD CAPITAL [hereinafter BURFORD, The Basics],
http://www.burfordcapital.com/litigation-finance/the-basics/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).  Juridica
Investments Ltd., which claims it is the leading commercial litigation financer in the United
States and the United Kingdom asserts: “Juridica accepts only cases that have already been
carefully vetted and undertaken by leading lawyers.”  It describes its market as “Fortune 1000
companies . . . and the leading law firms that represent them.” About Juridica, JURIDICA INVEST-
MENTS LTD, http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
18. Juridica’s threshold claim value for investment is $25 million. Investment Policy, JURIDICA
INVESTMENTS LTD [hereinafter JURIDICA, Investment Policy], http://www.juridicainvestments.
com/about-juridica/investment-policy.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).  Bentham Capital LLC’s
threshold for consideration is $10 million if the case is still in the early stages and $7 million if it
is in the appeal stage. The Funding Process, BENTHAM CAPITAL, http://www.benthamcapital.
com/what-we-do (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).  Bentham is the U.S. subsidiary of IMF (Australia)
Ltd, which is generally regarded as the first actor in the third-party litigation finance industry.
19. However, Juridica terms its business “corporate claim finance.” Our Public Policy State-
ment, JURIDICA INVESTMENTS LTD [hereinafter JURIDICA, Public Policy], http://www.juridi-
cainvestments.com/about-juridica/our-public-policy-statement.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
In the United States, litigation lenders appeared before litigation investors, with the result that
some refer to the lenders as “first wave” litigation financers and to the investors as “second
wave” litigation financers. See Steinitz, supra note 15, at 1277.  However, this pattern may be
limited to the United States.  Harbour Litigation Funding Ltd., the third-party litigation financ-
ing market leader in the United Kingdom, funds high-value commercial claims only. See Owen
Bowcott, Litigation Funders Become Big Business, Enjoying Booming Market in UK, GUARDIAN
(London) (May 25, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/may/25/litigation-funders-boom-
ing-market-uk/print.  The largest third-party litigation financer in Australia, IMF, funds high-
value commercial claims and damages class actions. About Us, IMF (AUSTL.) LTD., http://www.
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Although not treated as third-party funders by most litigation fi-
nancing scholars, law firms that invest time and expense in litigation
with the expectation of sharing their clients’ recoveries form another
segment of the litigation financing market.  However, in contrast to
the funders and investors who are conventionally considered litigation
financers, plaintiff-side law firms have a fiduciary duty to their clients.
Law firms representing plaintiffs may receive funding from other law
firms whose role is more similar to that of litigation investors.20  The
relationships between the law firm representing the plaintiffs and the
law firms helping fund the litigation may not be known to all involved
in the litigation.  The role and characteristics of these investor law
firms have yet to be systematically described.
Although class actions are sometimes brought on behalf of large
numbers of individuals of modest means who resemble claimants in
the litigation lending market, a damages class action most closely re-
sembles a single large commercial claim, both procedurally and finan-
cially.  Whether the class members receive damages depends on the
outcome of a single lawsuit.21  In the U.S. class action regime, a law
firm is appointed as class counsel by the judge assigned to the case.
Class counsel must invest resources up front to develop the facts and
law relevant to the litigation and represent the class in court proceed-
ings and settlement discussions.  If the class prevails, the judge awards
legal fees that usually are proportionate to the size of recovery;22 if the
class action fails, class counsel does not recoup its expenses.  As a con-
sequence of the procedural and financing rules, only firms with access
to substantial financial resources can participate in this sector of the
legal services market.
imf.com.au/about-us (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).  English law does not permit representative class
actions along the American model.
20. At least one commercial lender offers loans exclusively to plaintiff law firms operating on
contingent fees.  Counsel Financial, founded by plaintiffs attorneys, offers its loans as alterna-
tives to personal lines of credit.  The loans are backed by the total value of anticipated contin-
gent fees. See About Counsel Financial, COUNSEL FINANCIAL, http://attorneylending.com/about-
us/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).  Counsel Financial funded the lead plaintiffs’ attorney firm in the
nonclass World Trade Center follow-on litigation on behalf of recovery workers.  Counsel Finan-
cial itself is said to be funded by Citigroup.  Binyamin Applebaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits,
Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at 1.
21. The amount of damages received by individual class members may be uniform or differen-
tiated depending on the terms of the resolution.  In an opt-out regime class members may ex-
clude themselves from the litigation, leaving themselves free to pursue individual lawsuits.
22. As a matter of formal law, fees may be awarded either on an hours-and-expenses basis
(the “lodestar” method) or on a percentage-of-fund basis, but in practice most judges consider
the size of the class recovery in awarding fees. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 248, 248–50 (2010).
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Traditionally, plaintiff-side class action firms have financed their ac-
tivities by lines of credit that are secured ultimately by their personal
assets.  As is the case with commercial litigation investors, plaintiff-
side class action firms have good reason to carefully select cases that
will permit them to maximize return on investment.  Because litigating
a class action is expensive and time consuming, class action firms are
unlikely to represent a class unless there is a potential for large dam-
ages.  If class actions were to attract litigation financing, the funding
would come from the litigation investors, not the litigation lenders
who target individual plaintiffs.
To date, it appears that only one class action initiative in the United
States has secured third-party litigation financing: the Ecuadorian en-
vironmental damages litigation against Chevron.  That investment oc-
curred after the putative class action—which was never certified23—
was dismissed by a U.S. court.  The case began in 1993 as a putative
class action on behalf of Ecuadorian residents of the Amazon in the
federal court in the Southern District of New York.24  The plaintiffs
were represented by Steven Donziger, a crusading lawyer who had
previously worked as a public defender and was not affiliated with any
of the leading U.S. plaintiff-side class action firms.  After nine years of
litigation in federal court, the suit was dismissed on forum non con-
veniens.25  Two years later, a new suit arising out of the same factual
allegations was filed in Ecuador by a group of Ecuadorians that in-
cluded some of the original class representatives.  The proceedings
have been incredibly complex, including criminal and civil litigation in
Ecuador and two arbitrations pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty
between the United States and Ecuador, administered under the UN-
CITRAL Arbitration Rules.26  Along the way, the provincial court in
Sucumbı´os, Ecuador issued an $18 billion judgment against Chevron,
which was upheld (although ultimately slashed in half) by Ecuador’s
appellate court.27  By 2010 Chevron was back in the U.S. courts, pur-
23. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994).
24. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 626–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, Jota v.
Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
25. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified, 303
F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
26. See Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, UNCITRAL Arbi-
tration, Interim Award (Dec. 1, 2008), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0150.pdf; see also, Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No.
2009-23, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0155_0.pdf.
27. Press Release, Amazon Watch, Chevron Guilty Verdict Upheld by Ecuador Appellate
Court (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/2012/0104-chevron-guilty-verdict-
upheld-by-ecuador-appellate-court.
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suing charges of fraud in the Ecuadorian litigation, seeking a preemp-
tive injunction against enforcement of the Ecuadorian judgment, and
ultimately bringing RICO charges against Donziger and his
colleagues.28
In the early years of the Ecuadorian litigation, Donziger was appar-
ently funded by U.S. law firms.29  Third-party litigation investment en-
tities did not participate in the initial class action in U.S. federal
courts, when they might have been subject to judicial regulation under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.30  Notably, Ecuador
does not have a class action procedure that tracks the U.S. model.
The Ecuadorian complaint was filed by a group of individuals who
sought to protect the rights of the community under the Ecuadorian
Environmental Management Act of 1999 (EMA).31  The actions al-
lowed under the EMA do not allow for personal injury claims, but
instead allow individuals to bring “claims of collective nature affecting
an unidentifiable group or the entire community,”32 which are often
termed “diffuse interest” claims in civil law jurisdictions.33
In late 2010, with plaintiffs’ attorney Donziger apparently having
depleted his resources and the Ecuadorian provincial court in Sucum-
bı´os yet to deliver its judgment, Patton Boggs LLP received $4 million
in funding from third-party litigation financer Burford Capital Ltd. to
take over the case.  Patton Boggs, a fifty-year-old Washington, D.C.
firm that describes itself as a “public policy” law firm with roots in
international trade and business law,34 agreed to represent the Ecua-
28. For descriptions of the hard-fought and controversial Ecuadorian litigation, see Steven
Donziger et al., Rainforest Chernobyl Revisited: The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor
Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in Ecuador, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2010, at 8; Patrick
Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER, January 9, 2012, at 38; Michael Goldhaber,
The Global Lawyer: Latest Twists in Chevron’s Amazon Case Run Through Latin America, AM.
LAW. (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202578138704&The_
Global_Lawyer_Latest_Twists_in_Chevrons_Amazon_Case_Run_Through_Latin_America.
29. One of the early investors is said to have been Kohn, Swift & Graf, a Philadelphia-based
plaintiff firm that represented Filipino citizens in a human rights abuse class action against Ferdi-
nand Marcos and also participated in the Holocaust litigation against the Swiss Banks and Ger-
man companies. See Human Rights Cases, KHON SWIFT & GRAF, P.C., http://www.kohnswift.
com/site/PracticeAreas/HumanRights/tabid/66/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
31. Act No. 37/1999, Environmental Management Act (Ley de Manejo Ambiental), Registro
Oficial No. 245 (July 30, 1999) (Ecuador).
32. Manuel A. Go´mez, The Global Chase: Seeking the Recognition and Enforcement of the
Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 429, 436–37 (2013).
33. Deborah R. Hensler, Of Groups, Class Actions, and Social Change: Reflections on From
Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 126, 131
(2013) (book review).
34. About: History, PATTON BOGGS LLP, http://www.pattonboggs.com/about/history/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2013).
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dorian plaintiffs on a contingency fee basis.35  Patton Boggs’s lead law-
yer on the Ecuadorian case, James Tyrrell, Jr., was previously known
for his role as chief trial counsel defending corporations in mass claims
cases, including Agent Orange (typically described as the first success-
ful mass tort class action), DES, and the World Trade Center follow-
on litigation by rescue and recovery workers against the New York
City government and the contractors that provided these services fol-
lowing the attacks.36  Burford was said to have committed a maximum
of $15 million to the litigation and reportedly hedged its investment by
selling the initial $4 million share to another entity.37  A year later,
Burford announced that it would not invest further in the Ecuadorian
litigation.38  In January 2013, Chevron’s lawyers filed a letter dated
September 2011 from Burford to Donziger accusing him and the
plaintiffs of fraud, pursuant to Chevron’s ongoing RICO litigation
against Donziger.39  Burford subsequently charged that Tyrrell had
provided the firm with a misleading analysis of the case.40
The history of the Chevron–Ecuador litigation seems unlikely to
persuade third-party litigation investors to flock to high-profile, high-
value mass litigation against multinational corporations.  Indeed, since
entering the U.S. litigation financing market, Juridica has consistently
stated that it will not provide financing for class action lawsuits.41
Prior to the publication of Burford’s fraud charges against Donziger
and his associates, Tyrrell told reporter Alison Frankel that Burford
decided to move away from the Chevron case after Chevron “made it
clear that there would be repercussions if [Burford] continued fund-
ing.”42  Tyrrell claimed that Chevron had voiced its unhappiness di-
rectly to Burford and that the company had declined further
35. Leigh Jones, Feud Escalates Between Chevron, Ecuador Lawyers, REUTERS (October 6,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/06/us-chevron-lawyers-idUSTRE7956CB20111006.
36. Michael Goldhaber, Patton Boggs Explains Its Role in Explosive Chevron Case, AM. LAW.
LITIG. DAILY (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/12/pat-
tonchevron.html; see also Professionals, James E. Tyrrell, Jr., PATTON BOGGS LLP, http://www.
pattonboggs.com/professional/james-tyrrell (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
37. Alison Frankel, Can Ecuadorean Plaintiffs Keep Funding Case Against Chevron?,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/12/12/can-ecuadorean-
plaintiffs-keep-funding-case-against-chevron/.
38. Id.
39. Roger Parloff, Investment Fund: We Were Defrauded in Suit Against Chevron, CNN
MONEY, (Jan.10, 2013), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/01/10/burford-capital-chevron-ecua-
dor/.
40. Roger Parloff, Litigation Finance Firm in Chevron Case Says It Was Duped by Patton
Boggs, CNN MONEY (Apr. 17, 2013), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/04/17/burford-
patton-boggs-chevron-suit/.
41. JURIDICA, Public Policy, supra note 19.
42. Frankel, supra note 37 (quoting James Tyrrell, Jr., Attorney, Patton Boggs LLP).
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investment because it had been intimidated.43  In 2011, Patton Boggs
filed suit in federal court in Washington, D.C., charging Gibson,
Dunn, & Crutcher, Chevron’s hard-driving law firm, with “tortious in-
terference” in Patton Boggs’s relationship with its clients.44  Burford’s
website currently makes no mention of the Ecuadorian litigation and
describes its clients as businesses, law firms that do not operate on a
contingency fee basis, and contingent fee lawyers.45
Selvyn Seidel, the co-founder and former non-executive chairman
of Burford Capital who played a key role in Burford’s original deci-
sion to invest in the Ecuadorian litigation, later left Burford and
founded Fulbrook Capital Management LLC.46  Fulbrook describes
itself as an “institutional advisor in commercial claims” that “identi-
fies, evaluates, manages, and arranges capital for commercial claim-
ants to apply towards prosecuting meritorious claims.”47  Fulbrook’s
website makes no mention of class actions.  It is difficult to avoid the
inference that litigation investors who see their market as comprising
large corporations believe that it is politic to give class actions a wide
berth.
Putting aside Burford’s experience with the Chevron–Ecuador ex-
perience and attendant public relations issues, how likely is it that
third-party litigation financers will find success in the U.S. class action
litigation market?  In return for providing funding and absorbing a
significant fraction of the risk associated with commercial claims,
third-party litigation investors expect a large share of any monetary
recovery.  Today in the United States, the most successful plaintiff
class action firms are unlikely to find these terms attractive in compar-
ison to their return on investment that relies on conventional financ-
ing.  Commercial litigation financing might be attractive to new
entrants to the market or as a means of allowing an established firm to
penetrate or develop a new segment of the class action market while
limiting its risk.  Experienced federal judges who appoint class counsel
43. Id.
44. Press Release, Patton Boggs LLP, Patton Boggs Sues Chevron and Gibson Dunn for Tor-
tiously Interfering with the Firm’s Duties to Its Clients (Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://www.
pattonboggs.com/files/News/f5ce5b6e-ccaa-40cf-8c91-009d978f1e3a/Presentation/NewsAttach-
ment/e2313e74-5f72-44ca-b53a-0e2682e29937/Patton%20Boggs_Chevron_Gibson%20Dunn_
Suit_02_07_11_FINAL.pdf.
45. See BURFORD, The Basics, supra note 17.  The only specific type of litigation highlighted
on Burford’s website is commercial litigation. Id.
46. See Goldhaber, supra note 36; see also Roger Parloff, Have You Got A Piece of This
Lawsuit?, CNN MONEY (June 28, 2011), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/06/28/have-
you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit-2/.
47. Selvyn Seidel, Professional Details, CORP. LIVEWIRE, http://www.corporatelivewire.com/
profile.html?id=6f946e26bbbc095620c42c4453cbf8df7ffca1a0 (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
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in Rule 23 class actions might balk at appointing inexperienced liti-
gators to the position, but a firm with adequate financial resources
might succeed in persuading a less experienced state court judge that
it could satisfy the core class action requirement of “adequacy of rep-
resentation.”48  However, one third-party litigation financer has spec-
ulated that a law firm that disclosed its need for third-party financing
to support its representation would impair its chances of being se-
lected as lead counsel in a class action.49
III. UNPACKING THE CRITIQUE OF THIRD-PARTY FINANCING OF
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
What concerns would third-party litigation financing raise in the
U.S. class action domain?  Traditionally, common law jurisdictions
forbade third parties from taking a financial interest in someone else’s
lawsuit—a practice that lawmakers feared would encourage “frivo-
lous” or “vexatious” litigation.  Rules against champerty and mainte-
nance are still on the books in many states and have acted as brakes
on third-party litigation financing in those jurisdictions.50  In the
United States, contingency fee agreements between lawyers and cli-
ents do not violate these traditional rules, but such agreements are
prohibited or restricted in many non-U.S. jurisdictions.
The critique of third-party litigation financing in class actions ech-
oes both the traditional normative concerns about champerty and
maintenance and the political attack on contingency fee litigation.
However, critics of third-party litigation financing of class actions also
have concerns that are specific to class actions.51  The first set of con-
cerns focuses on the effect of third-party litigation investment on the
number of class actions, while the second set focuses on the potential
of third-party investment to exacerbate conflicts of interest and repre-
sentational issues inherent in class action litigation.
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (g).
49. Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Cana-
dian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Financing, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 133–34 (2013) (citing
conversation with Ralph Sutton, CEO of Bentham Capital).
50. Third-party litigation financing has provoked new scholarship on champerty and mainte-
nance. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 8; Steinitz, supra note 15; Jason Lyons, Comment, Revolution
in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571 (2010).
51. Concerns about third-party litigation financing of nonclass aggregated litigation are not
addressed in this Article.
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A. The Effect of Third-Party Litigation Investment on the
Number of Class Actions
No one knows the total number of class actions that are filed annu-
ally in U.S. federal or state courts (or in most jurisdictions outside the
United States),52 but it likely ranges in the thousands, constituting a
small fraction of the total U.S. civil litigation caseload.53  If there are
many instances that could lead to class actions but do not because law
firms lack the financial resources to pursue these cases, then the intro-
duction of additional financing into the legal market could logically
lead to an increase in litigation.  There are no data that allow us to
determine the number of potentially viable class actions, but available
data on individual litigation rates suggest that a sizeable fraction of
individual justiciable injurious incidents do not result in litigation, and
there is reason to think that this is also true with regard to mass
injuries.54
However, in attacking the third-party litigation financing of class
actions, the corporate community does not assert that there are
proper class actions that are currently barred from the courts because
of insufficient funding, but rather that third-party litigation financing
will produce a flood of frivolous class actions.  This assertion is based
on three assumptions about U.S. class actions: first, that the current
class action regime produces a host of frivolous class actions that de-
fendants are forced to settle because of their in terrorem effect; sec-
ond, that class action jurisprudence enables easy access to courts for
frivolous class claims; and third, that litigation investors’ business
models will favor frivolous claims.55  The available empirical data do
not support the first assumption about the current regime, and recent
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence as well as the economics of third-
party litigation financing militate against a flood of frivolous class ac-
tions going forward.
52. See The Globalization of Class Actions, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1
(Deborah Hensler et al. special eds., 2009) (in response to requests for information on the num-
ber of class action or group litigations filed in their jurisdictions, most authors responded that
courts in their jurisdictions did not report these data).
53. Deborah R. Hensler, Using Class Actions to Enforce Consumer Protection Law, in HAND-
BOOK OF RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW 515, 528–29 (Geraint Howells et al.
eds., 2010).
54. Deborah R. Hensler, The Socio-Economics of Mass Torts: What We Know, Don’t Know
and Should Know, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORTS, (Jennifer
Arlen ed., 2014).
55. The Chamber of Commerce supports its argument that third-party litigation financing in-
evitably will increase the number of class action lawsuits by reference to the Australian experi-
ence, where it claims this has occurred.  Part IV addresses the experience in Australia to date,
which does not support the Chamber’s argument.
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1. Assumption 1: The In Terrorem Effect of Class Actions
Currently Forces Defendants to Settle Frivolous Class
Claims
The claim of in terrorem effects of class filings leading to settlement
of frivolous complaints is so ingrained in public policy rhetoric that it
has been echoed by the U.S. Supreme Court.56  The claim may have
gained credence as a result of an apparent increase in consumer class
actions against insurers and other financial institutions during the
1990s,57 but there is little empirical evidence of in terrorem effects.
The two best sources of empirical information on the outcomes of
class action complaints are a 2007 RAND Institute for Civil Justice
study of class actions against insurers brought in state and federal
courts58 and a 2008 Federal Judicial Center study of diversity class ac-
tion complaints filed in federal court prior to the effective date of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).59  Only 14% of the state
and federal class actions that RAND studied were certified; of these,
most settled.  As a result, 12% of all class complaints resulted in class-
wide remedies.  In contrast, 37% resulted in a ruling on a dispositive
motion in favor of defendants; 20% resulted in a settlement with an
individual class representative; and 27% of the cases were voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiffs.60  The Federal Judicial Center reports that
of the class action lawsuits that were filed in federal court pre-CAFA
and not remanded to state courts, more than half (55%) were dis-
missed without class certification or class settlement, 29% were re-
solved by a ruling in favor of the defendant on a dispositive motion,
and 13% resulted in a class certification and settlement.61  Corporate
lobbyists opposing class actions do not generally refer to these data
with regard to the alleged in terrorem effects; however, in the recent
oral argument in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the
lawyer for American Express stated that only 20% of “putative class
56. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200 (2013).
57. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND CORP., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUB-
LIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 62–68 (2000); see also NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., RAND CORP.,
INSURANCE CLASS ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvii–xxv (2007), available at http://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG587-1.sum.pdf.
58. PACE ET AL., supra note 57.
59. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO’S
PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS (2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/pub-
lic/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa1108.pdf/$file/cafa1108.pdf.
60. PACE ET AL., supra note 57, at xxi.
61. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 59, at 6.
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actions” are certified.62  If there is an in terrorem effect of class action
filings, its magnitude is likely modest.
2. Assumption 2: Class Action Jurisprudence in the United States
Enables Easy Access to the Courts for Class Actions
If a marked increase in damages class actions in state and federal
courts during the 1990s really did provoke an in terrorem effect among
corporate defendants, by now that effect should be significantly di-
minished.  Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court, aided on
occasion by the U.S. Congress, has steadily raised the bar for plaintiff
success in damages class actions.63  Mass tort class actions, which
never had much of a run in the United States, have virtually disap-
peared as a result of the Supreme Court decisions in Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor64 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,65 replaced by
aggregated lawsuits resolved in multidistrict litigation.66  The Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) raised the stan-
dards for selecting class representatives,67 and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) prevented plaintiff class
counsel from turning to state courts to evade these restrictions.68
CAFA shifted formerly state court class actions to federal court in an
effort to subject them to more conservative judicial rulings.69  The Su-
preme Court met these hopes by restricting federal court jurisdiction
over securities class actions in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.70 and over Alien Tort Statute claims in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.;71 narrowing the substantive definitions of Rule 23(a)’s
core requirements for certification72 and increasing plaintiffs’ eviden-
tiary burden of proving that the certification requirements are met;73
62. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013) (No. 12-133).
63. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729
(2013).
64. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
65. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
66. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigation: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 113–14 (2010).
67. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
68. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
69. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scatted
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
70. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
71. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
72. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
73. Id. at 2551–52; see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).
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and endorsing defendants’ strategy of precluding any kind of collec-
tive proceeding by imposing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses.74
3. Assumption 3: The Third-Party Litigation Investment Model Will
Favor Frivolous Class Claims
The U.S. class action fee regime is unlikely to enable a plaintiff-side
firm to long sustain itself on frivolous claims, which available data sug-
gest would result, at best, in a small settlement with a putative class
representative—with proportionately small fees for the putative class
counsel.  At worst, bringing a frivolous claim would result in an ex-
pensive pretrial battle and a defense victory, with a financial loss for
class counsel, who will neither recover expenses nor win fees for time
spent on the case.  Whether because of this financial regime or be-
cause of class action jurisprudence, there are no objective data to sup-
port the proposition that the U.S. class action system is overrun with
frivolous suits.  Nor is there an empirical basis for Juridica’s claim that
“class action cases are not susceptible to the market-based determi-
nants that should drive settlements of corporate claims between busi-
nesses.”75  To the contrary, the frequent corporate community charge
that plaintiff-side class action lawyers are “entrepreneurs” is intended
to convey that they are market-driven, rather than driven by non-
monetary professional or ideological ideals.
The financial incentives inherent in class actions (and other civil liti-
gation where fee amounts depend on damages obtained) are more
likely to pervert lawyers’ settlement behavior than filing behavior.  A
class counsel whose fees and recovery of expenses depend on ob-
taining a settlement from the defendant may well agree too easily to
suboptimal (from the class members’ perspective) settlement offers so
as to ensure some payment.76  As the value of the class injuries in-
creases, the divergence between class counsel’s interests and the inter-
ests of individual class members may grow.  Defendants’ ability to
achieve res judicata “on the cheap” in return for an overly generous
class counsel fee is central to the scholarly critique of class actions.
Requiring judges to approve class action settlements and to award
74. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
75. JURIDICA, Public Policy, supra note 19.
76. There is a rich theoretical literature on the effects of contingent fee financing on settle-
ment behavior, which reaches inconsistent conclusions as to whether this type of financing in-
creases or decreases settlements (versus trial).  For a review of the literature and an argument
that contingent fee lawyers are more likely to go to trial than settle, see A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Note on Settlements Under the Contingency Fee Method of Compensating
Lawyers, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217 (2002).
514 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:499
class counsel fees—neither of which judges have authority to do in
ordinary individual litigation—and encouraging judges to require de-
tailed notices that specify settlement provisions and the amount of
fees that has been requested are all intended to mitigate the agency
costs of class actions.  However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
these restraints are not always effective, with the result that defend-
ants are at least sometimes able to obtain settlements favorable to
themselves and to plaintiff class counsel, but less so to class members.
There are no systematic data indicating how frequently this occurs.
From a defendant’s perspective, providing class counsel with access
to resources by introducing a new funding model that incentivizes the
latter to pursue class complaints more doggedly poses a more realistic
threat than the possibility of an avalanche of new class actions.  Third-
party litigation investors who have carefully screened claims to deter-
mine where to place their funds have a strong interest in ensuring that
the plaintiffs’ lawyers maximize the value of the claims in which the
financers invest.  There is no reason to expect that third-party litiga-
tion investors’ screening processes, which are emphasized in their in-
dividual commercial claims’ policies and practices, would not apply
similarly to class actions if and when investors decided to enter the
class action market.
Moreover, an investor managing a portfolio of class action claims
might have a different risk calculus with regard to a single class action
lawsuit than a plaintiff-side law firm whose resources are concentrated
in that same class action.  Like third-party investors, successful plain-
tiff-side class action firms invest in a portfolio of cases.  Rather than
changing these successful firms’ risk calculus (and settlement behav-
ior), the entrance of third-party litigation investors into the class ac-
tion market might produce more competition for such firms by
providing access to resources for smaller, and perhaps new, plaintiffs’
law firms.
Third-party investment might also incentivize corporate law firms to
agree to represent business entities that step forward as class repre-
sentatives in securities or antitrust litigation, as seems to be occurring
in Europe and is already happening in individual business-to-business
patent litigation in the United States.77  How third-party litigation in-
vestment would affect settlement values for different types of class
actions if and when third-party investors enter the market is unclear,
but corporate defendants might have a rational basis for fearing these
77. Juridica’s website mentions patent litigation as an area for appropriate investment (in con-
trast to class actions). See JURIDICA, Investment Policy, supra note 18.  Bentham also sees patent
litigation as an attractive area for investment in partnership with corporate law firms.
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outcomes.  However, it is difficult to discern the public policy argu-
ment against increased settlement values in meritorious cases if such
values are currently suboptimal as a result of the agency costs of class
action litigation, as some scholars have argued.
B. The Effect of Third-Party Litigation Financing on Conflicts of
Interest and Representational Challenges in Class Actions
Scholars have long treated “low ball” settlements as the primary
indicator of conflicts of interest between class counsel and class mem-
bers.78  As I argue supra, there is reason to believe that such settle-
ments would be less attractive to third-party litigation investors than
to underfinanced plaintiff-side class action law firms, and that plain-
tiff-side class action firms that secure third-party funding would be
enabled as well as incentivized to pursue litigation and obtain better
settlements for class members.
Some observers are concerned that the terms of third-party litiga-
tion contracts with plaintiff class counsel might be contrary to class
members’ interests, albeit attractive to class counsel.  Even if the class
representative were privy to the contract terms, there is a reasonable
concern that absent class members would be unaware of the terms,
and, indeed, unaware of third-party involvement in the case.79  Some
have suggested that this is a reason to prohibit third-party litigation
financing of class actions.  However, federal judges (and judges in
states with class action rules that mimic the Federal Rules) have tools
for confronting this challenge: Under Rule 23(e)(3), “[t]he parties
seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement
made in connection with the [settlement] proposal,” which should in-
clude an agreement between class counsel and third-party litigation
financers.80  In reviewing and approving a proposed settlement, the
judge could decide that such an agreement is not fair to class members
and decline to approve the settlement.  Under Rule 23(e)(1), the
judge could direct that the notice to class members of a pending settle-
ment include the terms of the litigation financing agreement, so that
class members would understand how their share of the settlement
would be affected by these terms, and either have the chance to object
to the terms or opt out.  Given the tradition of public interest organi-
78. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 79–86; see also Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1077–78 (1995).
79. I assume for this analysis that the class actions of interest are opt-out class actions and that
the class representative would not herself be able to bind absent class members to a litigation
financing agreement.
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3).
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zations and others coming forward to object to proposed settlement
terms and proposed class counsel fees,81 it seems likely that litigation
financing agreements would attract attention.  The potential for such
attention would likely constrain class counsel and third-party litigation
investors from agreeing to terms that were clearly against class mem-
bers’ interest.
However, federal judges need not rely on the interest of public or
private intervenors to inquire into the terms of third-party litigation
financing contracts with class counsel because the judges control the
appointment of counsel.  Under Rule 23(g)(1)(A)(iv), in appointing
class counsel, the judge must consider “the resources that counsel will
commit to representing the class.”  Under Rule 23(g)(1)(B), the judge
“may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class,” and under Rule
23(g)(1)(C), the judge “may order potential class counsel to provide
information on any subject pertinent to the appointment.”82  Together
these provisions give the judge broad authority to inquire into the
terms of any litigation financing agreement the proposed class counsel
has entered into and to decline such an appointment if she believes
the terms do not serve the class well.
When considering how third-party litigation financing might evolve
in the class action context, it is useful to recall that the much criticized
third-party litigation investment contract in the Chevron–Ecuador
case related to proceedings in Ecuador, which has no procedural rules
governing collective actions.  It is also notable that aggregated non-
class proceedings in the United States do not authorize judges presid-
ing over such litigation to inquire into attorneys’ fee agreements with
their clients nor, perhaps by extension, their agreements with third-
party investors.83  In this regard, as in many others, the U.S. class ac-
tion regime provides greater due process protections for claimants
than nonclass aggregated litigation—protections that could be
deployed to protect class members against third-party litigation fi-
nancing agreements that are inimical to their interests.84
81. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 94–99.
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) (emphasis added).
83. A few judges presiding over nonclass aggregated litigation have claimed authority to re-
view and approve settlements and fees, arguing that these cases are “quasi-class actions.”  Silver
& Miller, supra note 66, at 114; see also Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11
Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 176–77 (2012).
84. Where class members arguably have conflicts of interests among themselves the issues
would become more complex.  Under Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, certification of such a
class would require subclasses with separate class representatives and separate class counsel,
raising the spectre of separate litigation financing agreements with each class counsel. See
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626–27 (1997).  Applying Amchem’s represen-
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IV. LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA
In its advocacy materials, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce draws
attention to the experience of third-party litigation financing in Aus-
tralia, where it claims the advent of litigation investment has increased
the amount of civil litigation generally and the number of class actions
in particular.85  The Chamber rests this assertion on two sources: an
analysis by David Abrams and Daniel Chen of the relationship be-
tween civil and criminal caseloads and expenditures by Australia’s
leading third-party litigation financer,86 and an article by Stuart Clark,
a leading defense attorney, which describes and comments on Austra-
lia’s class action procedure and practice, but which contains no case
statistics.87
Class actions were introduced by statute in Australia’s federal
courts effective 1992, and in the states of Victoria, effective 2000, and
New South Wales, effective 2011.88  The federal rule was modeled af-
ter Rule 23(b)(3) by plaintiffs attorneys who had represented Austra-
lian plaintiffs in mass litigation in the United States and concluded
that their clients’ interests would be better protected in their home
jurisdiction.  Third-party litigation financing emerged in Australia to
address the barriers the traditional Australian fee regime imposed on
class action litigation and has succeeded in enabling class lawsuits.
tational principle might require that each class counsel contract with a different third-party liti-
gation investor.  As a practical matter this might preclude third-party litigation financing in
circumstances requiring subclassing.
85. BEISNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 9–11; ETHICAL & LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS, supra note 5,
at 17–22.
86. The Chamber’s publications cite a 2009 version of this article that is not currently available
on the web.  My description of Abrams and Chen’s methodology relies on David S. Abrams &
Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation Funding,
15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075 (2013), which appears to be an update of the 2009 article.  A third
version of the article that appears to rely on the same methodology but is singly authored by
Chen was provided to me by John Walker, the executive director of IMF (Australia) Ltd, whose
assistance with Abrams and Chen’s research is acknowledged by them.  In an e-mail to me,
Professor Abrams provided this clarification: “None of our work is specifically about class action
suits; we look at all civil litigation”; he also offers “a note of caution about interpretation of our
findings of a correlation between third-party funding levels and rates of litigation and duration
of litigation.”  E-mail from David S. Abrams to author (June 3, 2013) (on file with author).  As
discussed above, the Australian data on third-party litigation financing compiled by Professor
Abrams and his co-author include large commercial claims and class actions.
87. S. Stuart Clark, Thinking Locally, Suing Globally: The International Frontiers of Mass Tort
Litigation in Australia, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 139 (2007).
88. Vince Morabito, Australia, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 320, 320–21 (2009);
LAW REFORM COMM’N OF W. AUSTL., REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS: DISCUSSION PAPER
PROJECT NO. 103, at 26 (2013), available at http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/P/project_103.
aspx?uid=2035-7229-1142-4710.  The Western Australia Law Reform Commission is currently
considering recommending a class procedure. See generally id.
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However, contrary to the suggestion of the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, the empirical data show that the actual number of class law-
suits has been small.  Moreover, the outcomes of financed cases
suggest that third-party litigation financers have adopted quite con-
servative strategies in deciding whether to invest in class litigation.
A. The Australian Class Action Regime
The Australian class action procedure is well documented.89
Briefly, under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976
(Cth), a class proceeding requires seven or more persons with claims
against the same defendant arising out of the same or similar circum-
stances and raising common issues of law or fact.90  There is no certifi-
cation proceeding, but at any time during the process a judge may rule
that the statutory requirements for a class are not met and halt the
proceeding.  The statute mandates an opt-out procedure similar to the
American model: after notice and hearing, any class member who
does not opt out is bound by the outcome.  The judge may assess the
adequacy of class representation and require subclasses, and must ap-
prove any settlement.91  Civil lawsuits in Australia, including class ac-
tions, are decided by judges, not juries, and some class actions have
been tried to verdict.92
B. The Australian Legal Fee Regime
Although described by Clark as “plaintiff friendly,”93 the Australian
class action was introduced into a plaintiff unfriendly legal fee regime.
Australia requires fee-shifting, meaning that plaintiffs, including class
representatives, are subject to defense costs if defendants prevail.
Since the mid-1990s, attorneys have been permitted to enter into “no
win, no fee” agreements with their clients, including class representa-
tives.94  These agreements protect plaintiffs against the risk of having
to pay their own attorneys if they lose their case.  When plaintiffs pre-
vail, they pay their attorneys’ hourly charges and expenses, plus a pos-
sible premium of up to 25% of total hourly fees.  However, the
89. See, e.g., DAMIAN GRAVE ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA (2d ed. 2012); Stuart
Clark & Christina Harris, The Push to Reform Class Action Procedure in Australia: Evolution or
Revolution? 32 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 775 (2008); Morabito, supra note 88.
90. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt IVA; see also Morabito, supra note 88, at 322.
91. Morabito, supra note 88 at 322–23.
92. According to Clark, “There are numerous examples of class actions that have been either
successfully defended at trial or that were successfully struck through an attack on deficient
pleadings.”  Clark, supra note 87, at 148.
93. Id. at 139.
94. Morabito, supra note 88, at 323–24.
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attorney may not charge a percentage of damages obtained for the
plaintiff, as is often allowed in the United States in ordinary litigation
and awarded by U.S. judges to successful class counsel.  In the context
of Australian class actions, the allowable 25% premium may not be
sufficient to outweigh the considerable risks faced by the attorney on
a “no win, no fee” agreement.  Finally, with no contractual relation-
ship between the class representative’s attorney and the class mem-
bers, class members have no need to pay attorney fees (and are not at
risk for adverse costs), but are eligible to share in the settlement,
which creates a significant “free rider” problem.  Additionally, the
U.S. concept of authorizing judges to award fees in “common fund”
cases95 does not exist in Australian law.
C. Enter the Third-Party Litigation Investors
Third-party litigation investment appeared on the Australian class
action scene in the early 2000s, in response to the aforementioned fi-
nancial barriers.96  The challenge for funders was how to capture more
of the value of class litigation than permitted to plaintiffs’ attorneys in
return for protecting the class representative from the risk of adverse
costs.  The model that emerged was one in which the third-party litiga-
tion financer contracts with the individual class members to pay the
lawyer’s fees and up-front expenses and to take on the risk of adverse
costs, in exchange for a share of each class member’s recovery (if any).
This model solves three problems: it ensures that the lawyers have
sufficient resources to pursue an optimal recovery; it frees individuals
to come forward as class representatives without the risk of adverse
costs; and it eliminates the free rider problem (since all class members
contract with the third-party investor).  However, the result in Austra-
lia has been that the formal opt-out regime has become, in practice, an
opt-in regime.  After its inception, the third-party litigation funding
model was challenged on the grounds that it subverted the legisla-
ture’s intention, but in 2007 the federal court of Australia endorsed
it.97  Most funded class actions now proceed as “closed classes,” com-
prising only those who have signed contracts with the funder, which in
effect amounts to opting in.
95. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1980).
96. See Wayne Attrill, Litigation Funding: Access to Justice in a Time of Economic Crisis, IMF
(AUSTL.) LTD. 4 (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.imf.com.au/docs/default-source/site-documents/
globalaw-conference—-feb-2009.  Initially, IMF provided funding for insolvency proceedings.
97. See Multiplex Funds Mgmt. Ltd. v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd. (2007) 164 FCR 275
(Austl).
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The leading litigation funder in Australia is IMF (Australia) Ltd, a
publicly traded company.  IMF’s portfolio includes both individual
commercial claims and class claims.  Most claims that IMF funds, in-
cluding class actions, are filed in federal court.98  In 2003, IMF funded
its first shareholder class action.99  According to a 2012 review con-
ducted for IMF by Ernst & Young, IMF funded a total of 137 com-
pleted cases from 2001 to 2012, including individual and class action
lawsuits.100  IMF’s executive director John Walker estimated that IMF
has funded a total of approximately 200 cases, including matters
funded prior to its public listing in 2001.  Walker estimated that IMF’s
cases comprised about 70% of all claims that have been funded by
third-party investors in Australia over that period.101  According to
Ernst & Young’s review, the completed cases from 2001 onward gen-
erated AUD $803.7 million total income to IMF’s clients (including
recovered costs) and AUD $402 million total income to IMF, for a
total of AUD $1.2 billion.102  If IMF’s competitors were equally suc-
cessful, the net value of total funded litigation (including individual
and class action lawsuits) in Australia from 2001 to 2012 was about
AUD $1.7 billion.
D. Investment and Litigation Dynamics
Contrary to Juridica’s speculation about class action market behav-
ior, IMF appears to pursue a cautious investment strategy.  From Feb-
ruary 1999 to 2007, IMF is said to have agreed to fund 90 of the 763
cases that it considered.103  Of the 130 completed cases audited by
Ernst & Young, plaintiffs settled 67%, won trial judgments in 9%, and
lost five cases (4%) at trial.  In 20% of the cases, IMF terminated
funding before the case was concluded.104
98. E-mail from John Walker, Exec. Dir., IMF (Austl.) Ltd., to author (Apr. 2, 2013) [herein-
after Walker E-mail] (on file with author).
99. Hugh McLernon, Delivering Better Returns for Superfund Members Through Responsible
Investment, IMF (AUSTL.) LTD. 1 (June 25, 2012), http://www.imf.com.au/docs/default-source/
site-documents/delivering-better-returns-for-superfund-members-through-responsible-invest-
ment—-hm-29-jun-12.
100. ERNST & YOUNG, INDEPENDENT AUDITOR’S REPORT TO IMF: STATEMENT OF COM-
PLETED MATTERS (2012), available at http://www.imf.com.au/pdf/PortfolioAudit.pdf.
101. Walker E-mail, supra note 98.
102. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 100.
103. Abrams & Chen, supra note 86, at 22 (Note that this may be a later version of the paper
cited by BEISNER ET AL., supra note 5, which I have been unable to locate).  Abrams and Chen
cite confidential data provided to them by John Walker, executive director of IMF (Australia)
Ltd, as the basis for these numbers.  Abrams & Chen, supra note 86, at 22 n.81.
104. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 100.
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Do defendants in Australian class actions settle cases because of an
in terrorem effect?  According to Clark, “There are numerous exam-
ples of class actions that have been either successfully defended at
trial or that were successfully struck through an attack on deficient
pleadings.”105  Cases are tried to judges rather than juries, discovery is
limited, and exemplary (punitive) damages—although legal—are
rarely awarded.106  Additionally, litigation may move briskly: “In the
Federal Court of Australia, even complex matters can be scheduled
for hearing in a comparatively short time; indeed, it is not uncommon
for a matter to result in a hearing within nine months or less of being
filed.”107
The “closed classes” that are a product of third-party litigation in-
vestment benefit defendants by allowing them to better estimate likely
damages than in an opt-out regime.  Some Australian defense counsel
also say that the involvement of litigation investors facilitates settle-
ments by promoting business-like negotiations.108
E. Trends in Class Action Filings in Australia
Australia’s courts, like courts in other jurisdictions including the
United States, do not officially report the total number of class action
filings.  However, over the past several years, the Australian Research
Council has funded Professor Vince Morabito’s creation of a compre-
hensive database on class actions.  Morabito’s work is ongoing; his
most recently published database includes all federal class actions
filed from 1991 to 2009 and all Victorian class actions filed from 2000
to 2008.109  As shown in Figure 1, through calendar year 2008, a total
of 249 class action lawsuits had been filed in the federal court, and a
total of 24 in Victoria, with annual averages of 15 in the federal courts
and three in Victoria.  The federal class actions constituted less than
1% of annual federal court proceedings during the entire period.110
105. Clark, supra note 87, at 148.
106. Id. at 144–45, 149.
107. Id. at 144.  Clark suggests that the expeditious nature of Australian federal court litiga-
tion can be problematic for defendants, an interesting contrast to U.S. class action opponents’
claims of delays. Id.
108. Interviews with defense counsel, at Comparative Class Actions Seminar, Melbourne
Univ., Melbourne, Austl. (August 3–9, 2011) (on file with author).
109. VINCE MORABITO, AUSTRALIAN RESEARCH COUNSEL, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AUS-
TRALIA’S CLASS ACTION REGIMES: LITIGATION FUNDERS, COMPETING CLASS ACTIONS, OPT
OUT RATES, VICTORIAN CLASS ACTIONS AND CLASS REPRESENTATIVES 16, 18 (2010), available
at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Vince%20Morabito%202n
d%20Report.pdf.
110. Id. at 16 & tbl. 5.
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FIGURE 1: TRENDS IN AUSTRALIAN CLASS ACTION FILINGS,
FEDERAL AND VICTORIA (STATE) COURT111
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As one would expect for such small populations, there is substantial
variation from year to year, making it difficult to discern a pattern or
attribute increases or decreases to a single factor.  The largest number
of class actions was filed in 1998, which predated the development of
third-party litigation financing of class actions.  The second-largest
number appeared in 2002, around the time that IMF was publicly
listed, and the third largest appeared in 2007, after the federal court’s
August 2007 decision endorsing third-party funding.  However, as
shown in Figure 2, the 1998 and 2002 spikes appear to have nothing to
do with third-party litigation funding, but rather reflect an unusual
number of union actions on behalf of employees, which constituted
almost 20% of all federal class action filings from 1992 to 2008.  Secur-
ities class actions started to be a factor in 2004, but these types of class
actions alone do not explain the 2007 peak.112  In 2008, the total of
non-union federal class action filings, including securities actions, fell
back to its 1997 level.
111. Id. at 14 tbl. 3, 18 tbl. 6.
112. The securities class action filings data in Figure 2 are from GREG HOUSTON ET AL.,
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, TRENDS IN AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: 1 JANUARY
1993 – 31 DECEMBER 2009, at 4 fig. 1 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_
Recent_Trends_Australia_0510.pdf.  I have adjusted Morabito’s data to include these filings but
Figure 2 is a bit of a “mash-up” because I have put together two different datasets that were
created by different analysts and the reporting years are not entirely comparable.
2014] THIRD-PARTY FINANCING OF CLASS ACTION 523
FIGURE 2: DIVISION OF CLASS ACTION FILINGS, BY CASE TYPE113
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As in the United States, Australian attorneys sometimes file multi-
ple competing class actions related to the same dispute, of which only
one may produce a class-wide resolution. Morabito reports that the
249 federal class action filings from 1992 to 2008 were associated with
only 169 separate legal disputes.114  Although each of the competing
actions may be associated with some litigation activity, the presence of
competing actions suggests that the filings data give a somewhat in-
flated picture of the number of litigated class lawsuits in Australia dur-
ing the period.
Morabito’s database was truncated just about the time when law-
suits arising out of the global financial crisis began to emerge.  King &
Wood Mallesons, a corporate defense firm, publishes an annual report
on class action litigation in Australia that provides information about
developments since 2009.115  According to Mallesons, there were six
significant securities class action settlements in 2012, with a total value
of just under AUD $500 million.116  Further, among the highlights of
class action developments in Australia over the past several years has
been “the replacement of individuals (effectively straw men) by ‘so-
113. See MORABITO, supra note 109, at 14 tbl. 3, 18 tbl. 6; see also HOUSTON ET AL., supra note
112, at 4 fig. 1.
114. MORABITO, supra note 109, at 4.
115. KING & WOOD MALLESONS, CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 2012
(2013), available at http://www.mallesons.com/Documents/Class_Actions_in_Australia-The_
Year_in_Review_2012.pdf.
116. Id. at 9 tbl. 1.
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phisticated’ investors as the lead plaintiff in class proceedings.”117  In
other words, the typical lead plaintiff in financial class actions is now
an institutional investor, rather than an individual consumer or
shareholder.
The absolute numbers shown in Figures 1 and 2, and the small per-
centage of the federal court caseload they represented in each year of
the study period, challenge the suggestion that third-party litigation
financing contributed to a substantial rise in general civil litigation in
Australia.  In their unpublished 2009 paper Abrams and Chen esti-
mate that third-party funding has increased litigation overall by
16.5%.118  Abrams and Chen assert that funding a few hundred com-
mercial claims, including class actions that constitute less than 1% of
all federal filings, could lead to a 16% increase in civil litigation gener-
ally, which is difficult to believe.119  Whatever the benefits and draw-
backs of third-party litigation financing in Australia, the sky is not
falling there.
117. Id. at 7.
118. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 5, at 9.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce relied on
Abrams and Chen’s unpublished 2009 paper in its report.
119. The 16.5% figure Beisner et al. attribute to Abrams and Chen’s 2009 analysis does not
appear in Abrams and Chen’s 2012 paper, although the abstract for this more recent paper states
“we find some evidence that third party funding corresponds to an increase in litigation and
court caseloads.”  Abrams & Chen, supra note 86, at 1.  The claim that third-party litigation
funding has increased litigation is downplayed further in a brief description of the research by
Abrams. See David S. Abrams, Third-Party Litigation Funding, REGULATION, Winter
2011–2012, at 3.
The estimates in Abrams and Chen’s 2012 paper are based on econometric analysis.  The
regression coefficients measuring the effect of litigation funding on the number of filings are not
statistically significant although coefficients for some variables associated with court processing
of cases are.  The model appears to combine data drawn from IMF, which invests almost exclu-
sively in federal litigation, and Australian government judicial administration data, which include
state and federal court cases.  As in the United States, the number of state court filings far
outweigh the number of federal court cases.  The process through which funding federal com-
mercial litigation (including class actions) would increase state civil case filings (including in
states that do not offer a class action procedure) is unclear.  Moreover, Abrams and Chen’s
econometric model rests on the assumption that absent third-party litigation financing, criminal
and civil caseloads should rise or fall together across (state) jurisdictions and across time.  There
is no theoretical or empirical basis for this assumption.  In the United States, from 2001–2010
state court criminal case filings rose 8% and civil case filings rose 20%. RICHARD Y. SCHAUFF-
LER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 2, 8 (2012).  Meanwhile, in the federal courts,
criminal case filings rose 22% and civil case filings rose 11%. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2010, JUDICIAL CASELOAD IN-
DICATORS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJu-
dicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/front/IndicatorsMar10.pdf.  Civil and criminal caseloads in the
United States reflect different behavioral dynamics and legal policies; there is no reason to be-
lieve that the same is not true for Australia.
2014] THIRD-PARTY FINANCING OF CLASS ACTION 525
V. CONCLUSION: WILL THE SKY FALL IF THIRD-PARTY
LITIGATION FUNDERS INVEST IN U.S. CLASS ACTIONS?
The United States, of course, is not Australia—virtually all U.S.
state and federal courts permit class actions, damages class actions are
litigated on an opt-out basis, discovery is more generous  than in other
jurisdictions, class actions may be tried to juries that may award puni-
tive damages (although they rarely do), and plaintiff class counsel gen-
erally are awarded fees proportional to the damages they obtain for
class members.  However, the legal fee regime in the United States is
significantly different from the regime that prevailed in Australia at
the time the Australian federal class action procedure was enacted
into law and that still prevails there today.  In theory, if and when
third-party litigation investors enter the class action market in the
United States, the number of class actions might increase, there might
be more competition among plaintiff firms to serve as class counsel, a
greater fraction of class claims might proceed to certification, and set-
tlement values might rise.  However, in the face of U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence raising pleading and certification standards—and
endorsing corporate efforts to preclude any type of class proceeding
by incorporating mandatory arbitration clauses in a host of consumer,
small business, and employment contracts—these outcomes seem un-
likely any time soon.
In the Henny-penny story, having persuaded herself that the sky is
falling when she was hit by a single acorn, Henny-penny gathers her
barnyard companions together and they run off to see the king to
share the news and seek his protection.  Along the way the animals
meet Foxy-woxy who persuades them that he knows the best path to
the king’s palace and then leads them instead into his lair, where he
eats all of them.  Neither anecdotal evidence of third-party litigation
investors’ strategies in the United States, nor contemporary U.S. class
action jurisprudence, nor empirical data on trends in Australian class
actions, suggest that the sky will fall any time soon should third-party
litigation financing migrate to the class action domain in the United
States.  The animals in the barnyard should be wary of following
Henny-penny off to see the king, lest they encounter Foxy-woxy on
the way.
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